Daily Summary
Snake Keylogger activity surged today with 7 new samples detected, a 75% increase over the 7-day average of 4. This marks the third consecutive day of rising volume, indicating a deliberate push rather than a random spike. The campaign is notable for its heavy reliance on PowerShell scripts, which account for 6 of the 7 samples.
New Samples Detected
The sample distribution is heavily skewed toward PowerShell payloads (.ps1), representing 86% of today’s total, with a single JavaScript (.js) file making up the remainder. This is a meaningful shift from recent patterns, which typically saw a more balanced mix of document-based payloads (e.g., .docm, .xlsm) and scripting formats. The near-total pivot to .ps1 suggests the operators are streamlining delivery to reduce detection surface, likely because script-based execution bypasses macro security controls that many organizations have now hardened.
C2 Infrastructure
One new C2 server was identified today, bringing the active infrastructure to a modest count. The single new server is hosted on a low-cost VPS provider commonly abused in credential-harvesting campaigns. While infrastructure churn is expected with Snake, the operator pairing this fresh C2 with the PowerShell-heavy delivery suggests a coordinated refresh of both payload and command channel, reducing the effectiveness of prior blocklists.
IOC Highlights
Eight new IOCs were added to the tracker, including the new C2 domain, six file hashes corresponding to today’s PowerShell samples, and one hash for the JavaScript file. Analysts should prioritize the hashes for endpoint detection, as the script-based payloads are likely to be executed in memory, leaving minimal disk artifacts for forensic recovery.
Security Analysis
The pivot to PowerShell is notable when compared to Snake Keylogger’s historical campaigns, which have repeatedly relied on phishing emails with weaponized Office documents. This shift may indicate the operators are adapting to environments that have deployed macro-stripping or attachment sandboxing. However, the JavaScript sample in today’s batch is a reminder that the group is not fully abandoning mixed formats, possibly testing which vector yields better infection rates. Defenders should treat PowerShell execution policy and script-block logging as the primary choke point, and enforce constrained language mode for any process that does not explicitly require full PowerShell functionality to reduce the viability of these payloads.