Apache Camel AS2 SSRF enables internal network access (CVE-2026-80344) [PoC]

Exploitation confirmed - public proof-of-concept - CVE-2026-80344 is a high-severity server-side request forgery (SSRF) in Apache Camel 4.0.0 through 4.18.4 and 4.19.0 through 4.22.0 that lets a remote AS2 sender force the Camel instance to connect to a host of the attacker’s choosing. Fixed in Apache Camel 4.23.0, with backports in 4.18.5 and 4.22.1.

Overview

Apache Camel’s AS2 component handles the AS2 EDI messaging protocol used for business-to-business document exchange. When a partner requests an asynchronous Message Disposition Notification (MDN), the receiving Camel instance sends a receipt to an address the sender supplies. Before this fix, camel-as2 took that address directly from the inbound message and used it as the destination for the outgoing receipt, without checking it against anything the deployment had configured.

In short, the attacker controls where the server connects next.

Versions before 4.0.0 are not affected by this specific code path. The 4.18.x LTS stream is affected through 4.18.4, and the 4.22.x LTS stream through 4.22.0.

Impact

A remote, unauthenticated AS2 partner can direct the Camel instance to make outbound connections to any address it can reach. That includes hosts that are only routable from inside the deployment’s network, such as internal services, metadata endpoints, and admin interfaces that are normally shielded from the internet. The AS2 receiver becomes a pivot point.

Where the deployment has configured credentials for MDN delivery, those credentials are presented to the attacker-chosen destination. An attacker can therefore capture them or use them against legitimate targets. CVSS scores this at 8.2 (HIGH): network-reachable, low complexity, no privileges or user interaction required.

Remediation

Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. The asynchronous MDN destination is now constrained instead of taken verbatim from the inbound message.

• Users on the 4.18.x LTS stream: upgrade to 4.18.5.
• Users on the 4.22.x LTS stream: upgrade to 4.22.1.

If you cannot upgrade immediately:

• Restrict outbound connectivity from the AS2 receiver so it can only reach the partner endpoints it legitimately delivers receipts to. Deny everything else, including link-local and internal RFC 1918 ranges the receiver has no reason to touch.
• Do not attach credentials to MDN delivery that are valid for any host other than those partners.
• Log and alert on outbound connections from the AS2 receiver that fall outside its expected destination set.

Security Insight

This is the same class of mistake that keeps recurring in integration middleware: trusting a value from the inbound message to decide where the server goes next. Apache has been unusually busy patching Camel this cycle, and the pattern in middleware frameworks is consistent - protocol handlers get built for interop first and bound-checked later. Compare the ActiveMQ CVE-2026-34197 situation, where an Apache messaging component also became the front door for attackers. Teams running B2B gateways should treat every SSRF fix as a reminder to audit their own egress allowlists, not just their patch level.

Further Reading

• Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2026-34197 added to CISA KEV catalo
• All High Vulnerabilities
• Recent Critical Vulnerabilities
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